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to hold at least two public hearings on
any such petition, this bill would provide
that only the record from the final hearing is required to be submitted to OAL,
if FGC determines the petition is warranted. AB 2196 is a two-year bill pending in the Assembly Committee on Water,
Parks and Wildlife.
LITIGATION:
In California Coastal Commission v.
Office of Administrative law, et al., No.
A039703 (1st Dist., May 17, 1989), the
California Supreme Court denied OAL's
petition for review by a 3-4 vote. (See
CRLR Vol. 9, No. 3 (Summer 1989) p. 28
for background information on this case.)
In California Chapter of the American Physical Therapy Ass'n et al., v.
California State Board of Chiropractic
Examiners, et al., Nos. 35-44-85 and
35-24-14 (Sacramento Superior Court),
petitioners and intervenors challenge the
Board's adoption and OAL's approval
of section 302 of the Board's rules, which
defines the scope of chiropractic practice. In January 1989, the court preliminarily invalidated provisions of section
302 permitting chiropractors to perform
colonies and enemas, pre- and post-natal
obstetric care, physical therapy, ultrasound, thermography, and soft tissue
manipulation. However, the court recently granted in part the Board's motion
for reconsideration of the previous ruling,
and preliminarily reinstated the provisions allowing chiropractors to perform
physical therapy, ultrasound, thermography, and soft tissue manipulation. In
light of this ruling, petitioner California
Medical Association has indicated its
intent to file an amended complaint
which will substantially narrow the issues
in the case; that filing was expected by
mid-November. A status conference is
scheduled for January 5, 1990. (See
CRLR Vol. 9, No. 3 (Summer 1989)
p.28 and Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring 1989)
p. 37 for background information on
this case.)

OFFICE OF THE
AUDITOR GENERAL
Acting Auditor General: Kurt Sjoberg
(916) 445-0255
The Office of the Auditor General
(OAG) is the nonpartisan auditing and
investigating arm of the California legislature. OAG is under the direction of
the Joint Legislative Audit Committee
(JLAC), which is comprised of fourteen
members, seven each from the Assembly
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and Senate. JLAC has the authority to
"determine the policies of the Auditor
General, ascertain facts, review reports
and take action thereon... and make recommendations to the Legislature ... concerning the state audit...revenues and expenditures .... " (Government Code section
10501.) OAG may "only conduct audits
and investigations approved by" JLAC.
Government Code section 10527 authorizes OAG "to examine any and all books,
accounts, reports, vouchers, correspondence files, and other records, bank accounts, and money or other property of
any agency of the state ... and any public
entity, including any city, county, and
special district which receives state funds
... and the records and property of any
public or private entity or person subject
to review or regulation by the agency or
public entity being audited or investigated to the same extent that employees
of that agency or public entity have
access."
OAG has three divisions: the Financial Audit Division, which performs the
traditional CPA fiscal audit; the Investigative Audit Division, which investigates
allegations of fraud, waste and abuse in
state government received under the Reporting of Improper Governmental Activities Act (Government Code sections
10540 et seq.); and the Performance
Audit Division, which reviews programs
funded by the state to determine if they
are efficient and cost effective.
RECENT AUDITS:
Report No. P-768 (May 1989) is entitled "The Chancellor's Office of the
California Community Colleges Has Developed Procedures That Result in a
Circumvention of Many State Fiscal Controls." The Chancellor's Office of the
California Community Colleges (Chancellor's Office) is the administrative arm of
the Board of Governors of the California
Community Colleges, and serves primarily as a planning, reporting, advising,
and regulating agency for the seventy
California community college districts.
The Chancellor of the California Community Colleges is appointed by the
Board of Governors. The legislature appropriates funds to the Board of Governors for the support of the Chancellor's
Office and for local assistance activities
such as educational programs at community college districts.
OAG was initially charged with examining the relationship between the Chancellor's Office and its fiscal agents, including
various community college districts and
the Community College Foundation
(Foundation). The Foundation was estab-

lished by the Board of Governors in
1983 for the purpose of assisting and
promoting the educational activities of
the Board of Governors on behalf of the
California Community Colleges. OAG
sought to determine whether the Chancellor's Office had used its fiscal agents in
ways which bypass the state's civil service
system and fiscal controls.
This audit led to the arrest of the
former acting Dean of Special Services,
an employee of the Chancellor's Office.
He was charged with grand theft of
state funds and conflict of interest involving over $950,000 in payments issued
by four community college districts acting as the Chancellor's Office's fiscal
agents. As a result of the alleged theft,
OAG expanded the scope of its audit to
include a comprehensive review of fiscal
activities and internal controls related to
the Student Services and Special Programs Unit, covering the period from
October 1986 through December 1988.
OAG's findings indicate that the
Chancellor's Office used a variety of
methods to bypass the state's controls
over receipts, expenditures, and hiring.
The report includes recommendations
to the Chancellor's Office and the legislature to ensure appropriate use of the
state's funds. OAG also suggested that
the Chancellor's Office's legal counsel
review all contract proposals (as is required by its contracts manual) to ensure
that the Chancellor's Office adheres to
all applicable civil service standards.
Report No. P-827 (August 1989) concerns the operation and funding of the
Public Utilities Commission's (PUC)
California Relay Service (CRS) for the
deaf and hearing-impaired. The relay
service allows deaf and severely hearingimpaired individuals in California to use
telephones to communicate with hearing
individuals in California. OAG found
that although the PUC has taken steps
to promote program efficiencies, the
Commission has not fully ensured that
the relay service is operated in the most
cost-efficient manner. The PUC could
reduce the expenses of the relay service
by using a less expensive long distance
service provided by AT&T, by using
another provider of long distance service,
or by using another method of providing
access to the relay service. Depending
on the alternative selected by the Commission, the savings could range from at
least $1.l million to approximately $2.6
million annually. However, even considering the proposed expense reductions,
the Deaf Equipment Acquisition Fund
Trust (DEAF Trust), which funds the
relay service and equipment programs
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for the deaf and disabled, could have
an annual operating deficit of approximately $7.3 million after the current
funding legislation expires on July I,
1990. This operating deficit could result
in insufficient funding for the relay
service beginning in fiscal year 1992-93.
If the Commission cannot augment funding through legislation, it will have to
consider alternatives to reduce the level
of services to match the level of funding.
Report No. P-870.1 (May 1989) is
an audit of the State Department of
Education's (SDE) implementation and
management of various programs mandated by Senate Bill 65 (Chapter 1431,
Statutes of 1985). These programs are
intended for high school dropouts and
students at risk of becoming dropouts.
OAG also reviewed certain aspects of
SDE's participation in the California
Local Education Reform Network, a process designed to provide participating
school districts and schools with a plan
to improve the school environment. The
review was limited to SDE and did not
include audit work at the school district level.
OAG found that, generally, SDE
awarded the grants and contracts appropriately for programs mandated by SB
65. The. Department also conducted the
required evaluations of these programs.
However, there was no way to accurately
determine the amount of time the employees in SDE's High Risk Youth Unit and
the Alternative Education Unit spent
working on various programs, because
the employees did not keep accurate
time reports. Therefore, appropriations
were not always used for the programs
for which they were intended. In addition, the Department did not always
obtain contract approval from the Department of General Services before
allowing contract work to begin, nor did
it monitor the expenditure of grants for
one of the programs mandated by SB 65.
This report made several recommendations to SDE to ensure that funds are
being used for their intended purposes:
-The Department should ensure that
the High Risk Unit and the Alternative
Education Unit comply with State Administration Manual and departmental requirements to allocate their salary costs
according to the hours spent on programs.
-The Superintendent of Public Instruction should direct the Department to
ensure that schools receiving grants for
SB 65's model repository program submit
required expenditure reports, and the
Department should continue sending invoices to schools that do not submit
expenditure reports.
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-To ensure proper management of
contracts for employees, SDE should
obtain approval from the Department
of General Services for all contracts before the contract work begins.
Report No. P-874 (July 1989) is entitled "A Review of the Riverside County
Department of Mental Health Contracts
With the Harvest of Wellness Foundation." This report examined the Riverside County Department of Mental
Health's (RCDMH) monitoring of the
Harvest of Wellness (HOW) Foundation,
a contract mental health provider.
OAG determined that RCDMH failed
to monitor the administrative and fiscal
activities of the HOW Foundation as
required by RCDMH's policy, even
though it was aware that the Foundation was having management problems.
RCDMH cited staffing limitations as
contributing to its insufficient monitoring. Moreover, when it became aware
that the HOW Foundation inappropriately charged costs, RCDMH did not
require prompt repayment because it believed that doing so might put the HOW
Foundation out of business. Finally,
RCDMH did not promptly issue requests
for proposals when it became aware of
problems with the HOW Foundation
because RCDMH has no policy regarding RFPs, nor did RCDMH believe that
there were qualified alternate contracts
in the area.
The report recommends that the
RCDMH take the following actions:
comply with its policy to conduct formal
annual reviews of its contractors no later
than halfway through the contract year;
take action to ensure that problems surfacing during formal and informal evaluations are corrected; take steps to recover
overclaimed costs; and develop a policy
on when to issue RFPs to encourage
competition and to ensure that it obtains
the best available contractor.
Report No. 831 (August 1989) is entitled "California's Hazardous Waste
Management Program Continues to Improve But Needs to More Fully Enforce
State Laws and Regulations." This report concerns the Department of Health
Services' (DHS) regulation of hazardous
waste facilities subject only to the state's
hazardous waste laws, and its progress
in administering the state's hazardous
waste management program.
The report states that since OAG's
last report in May 1986 (see CRLR Vol.
6, No. 4 (Fall 1986) pp. 22-23 for background information), DHS' administration of the state program has improved.
DHS now generally initiates enforcement
action against facilities which violate
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hazardous waste laws and regulations,
and it has developed a tracking system
for its permitting, surveillance, and enforcement activities. However, DHS is
missing opportunities to identify violations of the state's hazardous waste laws
and regulations and does not always
ensure that violations are corrected. For
example, the Department has failed to
detect and deter violations of the requirements for manifested waste shipments
because it does not use the Hazardous
Waste Information System (HWIS) to
track shipments and does not always
investigate manifest exception reports.
OHS has also missed opportunities to
identify possible mishandling of wastes
because it does not always investigate
public complaints alleging such activities.
In addition, the Department does not
always verify that hazardous waste facilities meet the state's requirements for
financial responsibility. Finally, DHS is
not, in all cases, receiving full payment
for fines resulting from enforcement actions because it lacks a system to track
these actions from start to finish.
OAG's recommendations to DHS include the following: develop and implement a system to track all formal enforcement actions from the time the action is
initiated until all applicable fines are paid
and collected by the Department; respond
to, act upon, and document all complaints;
and fully investigate the financial stability
of hazardous waste facilities.
Report No. P-861.3 (July 1989) is
OAG's third quarterly monitoring report
of the Alameda-Contra Costa Transit
District's (district) financial and administrative controls. The report reveals that
since OAG's initial monitoring report,
the district has taken steps to improve
its operations. (See CRLR Vol. 9, No. 3
(Summer 1989) p. 29 for background
information.) The district has improved
the accuracy of its budget process and
disseminated its policy prohibiting the
use of district resources for nondistrict
purposes. In addition, the last of the
directors who owed the district money
for travel and personal expense overpayments has agreed to repay the district.
Despite its improved budgeting process, OAG found that the district needs
to correct its system for reporting budget
variances. To improve its financial condition, OAG recommends that the district implement its goal of developing a
balanced or surplus budget for fiscal
year 1989-90, and continue its efforts to
control expenses and increase revenues
and subsidies.
Report No. F-859 (July 1989) concerns direct service contracts between
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three departments within the Health and
Welfare Agency (agency) and nonprofit
organizations. From 1980 through 1982,
the legislature enacted direct service contract reforms for departments within the
agency to follow in their award of such
contracts to nonprofit organizations and
their administration of those contracts.
The purpose of the reforms was to ensure
that, before awarding direct service contracts to nonprofit organizations, departments within the agency would provide
these organizations with the appropriate
information to enable them to faithfully
execute the contracts and meet the audit
standards that are established by agency
departments.
The Department of Aging, the Department of Health Services, and the Department of Social Services had the greatest
number of direct service contracts with
nonprofit organizations in fiscal year
1987-88, so OAG reviewed their compliance with the direct service contract
reforms. During its review of contracts
for fiscal year 1985-86 through fiscal
year 1987-88 at these departments, OAG
found that the departments did little to
comply with the statutory reforms. Specifically, OAG found that the three departments did not identify the programs
for which they awarded direct service
contracts. In addition, the departments
did not always follow all of the procedures required during the process of bidding and awarding direct service contracts.
Furthermore, the departments did not
ensure that the direct service contractors
had the required financial and compliance audits. Finally, the departments
did not meet the goal of resolving disputes with nonprofit organizations within
sixty days. OAG recommended that the
agency inform its departments of the
requirements of the Direct Services Contracts Reform Act and ensure that they
follow its procedures.

COMMISSION ON CALIFORNIA
STATE GOVERNMENT
ORGANIZATION AND
ECONOMY (LITTLE HOOVER
COMMISSION)
Executive Director:
Jeannine L. English
Chairperson: Nathan Shapell
(916) 445-2125
The Little Hoover Commission was
created by the legislature in 1961 and
became operational in the spring of 1962.
(Government Code sections 8501 et seq.)
Although considered to be within the
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executive branch of state government
for budgetary purposes, the law states
that "the Commission shall not be subject to the control or direction of any
officer or employee of the executive
branch except in connection with the
appropriation of funds approved by the
Legislature." (Government Code section
8502.)
Statute provides that no more than
seven of the thirteen members of the
Commission may be from the same political party. The Governor appoints five
citizen members, and the legislature
appoints four citizen members. The balance of the membership is comprised of
two Senators and two Assemblymembers.
This unique formulation enables the
Commission to be California's only truly
independent watchdog agency. However,
in spite of its statutory independence,
the Commission remains a purely advisory
entity only empowered to make recommendations.
The purpose and duties of the Commission are set forth in Government
Code section 8521. The Code states: "It
is the purpose of the Legislature in
creating the Commission, to secure assistance for the Governor and itself in promoting economy, efficiency and improved
service in the transaction of the public
business in the various departments, agencies, and instrumentalities of the executive branch of the state government, and
in making the operation of all state
departments, agencies, and instrumentalities and all expenditures of public funds,
more directly responsive to the wishes
of the people as expressed by their elected representatives .... "
The Commission seeks to achieve
these ends by conducting studies and
making recommendations as to the adoption of methods and procedures to
reduce government expenditures, the
elimination of functional and service
duplication, the abolition of unnecessary
services, programs and functions, the
definition or redefinition of public officials' duties and responsibilities, and the
reorganization and or restructuring of
state entities and programs.
MAJOR PROJECTS:
Report on California s Board and
Commissions (July 1989). In response
to the substantial increase in the number
of boards and commissions in California
during the last twenty years, the Little
Hoover Commission initiated this survey
into the roles, functions, staffing, and
budgets of these organizations. After
reviewing California'a boards and commissions for over ten months and con-

ducting a public hearing on the matter,
the Commission released a report containing its findings.
The report focused on the following
four basic types of boards and commissions: (1) advisory bodies, which are
created to provide appropriate input on
particular issues; (2) regulatory bodies,
which are charged with oversight responsibilities for particular occupations
or industries; (3) administrative bodies,
which cover a wide variety of responsibilities ranging from increasing public
awareness of particular issues to promoting employment of the disabled, and
which also include the many "authorities" within state government, whose
primary responsibility is to provide financing for specific types of projects
through the sale of bonds and tax-exempt
notes; and (4) marketing orders, which
are self-help, industry-government marketing programs which may provide for
advertising and sales promotion, research
into production, processing, and distribution methods, the establishment of
quality standards accompanied by an
inspection program, supply management,
and the prohibition of unfair trade practices. The Commission found that 361
organizations fall into these four categories; it then focused its attention on
the 325 such organizations with annual
budgets of under $5 million.
The Commission found that wide
differences exist in the budgets, staffing,
responsibilities, and legal authority of
similarly titled organizations. However,
the study concluded that underlying the
creation of these organizations are similar
goals, including the following: encouraging broader participation in government
by citizens who would not otherwise be
actively involved; allowing the airing of
competing or differing viewpoints in
open forums; bringing together a group
of informed and responsible citizens to
deliberate and seek a consensus; insulating executives from undue pressure
from special interests; and reducing the
possibility of arbitrary action by an executive official.
The report then outlined reasons to
exercise restraint or caution in the creation and use of boards and commissions,
including the following: the more people
involved in the decisionmaking process,
the more difficult it becomes to fix responsibility for results; a plural body by
its very composition cannot decide or
act as expeditiously as a single executive;
special interest representatives on a board
may have an undue influence that is
contrary to the general public interest;
boards may be expensive due to members'
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